Inequality in the distribution of physicians across the United
States and the possible influence of physician supply on the demand for their services are subjects of continuing interest to economists and health policy makers. If physicians choose their locations partly for reasons unrelated to demand, and, if, given their locations, they can increase or decrease the demand for their services independently of changes in price, the implications for economic analysis and for public policy are profound. Some economists [Fuchs-Kramer 1972; Evans 1974] have reported evidence in support of the demand-shifting hypothesis, but others are skeptical [Sloan-Feldman 1977] . Many physicians believe that they have almost unlimited power to shift demand. This belief is based on introspection, clinical experience, and the correlation between supply and utilization, but skeptics offer several alternative explanations for the correlation.
The principal purpose of this paper is to shed some light on this question through a multi-equation, multi-variate analysis of differences in the supply of surgeons and the demand for operations across geographical areas of the United States. In-hospital operations seem particularly well suited for analysis of demand-shifting because several of the problems that have hampered previous studies can be avoided or minimized. The following section discusses the hypothesis of demand-shifting and indicates why this study provides a good test of it. The analytical framework and data are then described, followed by *1 am grateful to Louis Garrison and Natalie Ziegler for research assistance, to Lawrence J. Lau for econometric advice, and to the participants in the NBER conference "The Economics of Physician and Patient Behavior" for helpful comments on an earlier draft. a section reporting the empirical results and a concluding section which considers some implications.
The "DemandShifting" Hypothesis Standard economic analysis assumes that the supply and demand schedules in any market are independent. Given an exogenous increase in supply, a new equilibrium is reached by moving down the (constant) demand curve, as shown in Figure lA . The demand-shift hypothesis asserts that "given an exogenous shift in the supply of physicians from S1 to S2, the physicians induce a shift in demand from D1 to D2" (see Figure 1B ).
Another way of viewing demand-shifting is presented in Figure 2 .
The benefits from increases in the quantityof medical care, either to an individual patient or to a population, can be assumed to increase at a decreasing rate, hence the falling marginal benefit curve MB. For simplicity, let us assume that the, cost of medical care to the patient (financial cost, time costs, risks, etc.) increases at a constant rate, shown by the marginal cost curve MC. If patients had full information and full control over the quantity of care, they would choose quantity Q.
The fact that the quantity may be determined by the physician does not in itself imply demand-shifting. The physician, acting as an unbiased agent of the patient, may also choose quantity Q. If, however, the physician chooses and the patient accepts a quantity of care greater than or less than Q, we would say that there has been demand-shifting.
Note that demand can be shifted either up (to the right) or down (to the left). Let us assume that, other things equal, physicians prefer to come as close to Q as possible, i.e., they derive utility from ordering the amount of care which equates marginal cost and marginal benefit for their patients.' Let us also assume that physicians derive utility from income and that work (at least beyond some level) is a source of disutility. If the physician/population ratio is relatively high in an area (for reasons unrelated to demand) they may push quantity to the right of Q in order to keep prices and incomes from falling drastically.
If there are relatively few physicians in an area, and if they cannot or do not raise price to an equilibrium level, they may push quantity to the left of Q in order to avoid excessive work. This latter situation, sometimes characterized as "excess demand," has been offered as an explanation for the observed correlation between supply and utilization [Feldstein 1970 ]. Itwouldbedescrjbed inFigurelAbya pricewhich is below the intersectjonofS1anddemand. Ashiftof supply to the right results in higher utilization because it takes care of some of the excess demand.
Note that the presence of demand-shifting should not be equated with "unnecessary care." If "necessary care" is defined as Q in Figure 2 , demand-shifting to the left implies that some patients are not getting the care they should, and does not Imply that any patients are getting unnecessary care. Moreover, necessary care may be defined differently than the quantity that maximizes the patient's utility (I.e., Q). If, for instance, it Is defined as the quantity that maximizes the patient's health regardless of cost, the optimum would clearly be to the right of Q and such demand-shifting would not necessarily imply "unnecessary care."
This study of in-hospital operations provides a sharp test of demand shifting for several reasons. First, operations are typically well-defined procedures; it Is, therefore, possible to get a direct measure of quantIty. There is some variation in average complexity of operations (as measured by the California Relative Value Scale) across geographical areas; the coefficient of variation for 11 frequently performed procedures is 6 percent. A Count of operations, however, is likely to be a much better measure of quantity of medical care than a count of office visits, which may vary greatly with respect to length, number of tests and X-rays, etc. Furthermore, variations in average complexity can be studied separately.
-A second reason why operations should provide an interesting study of demand shifting is that we can rule out "excess demand" (1. e. demand shifting to the left)
as an important explanation for any observed relation between supply and utilization.
Excess demand may exist for house calls and other types of services rendered by general practitioners, where price seems to be below its equilibrium level and non-price rationing is observed, but such phenomena are rare in surgery. Economists and physicians who have studied surgical The "cost of time" explanation is also likely to be less relevant for operations than for physician office visits. This explanation for the cofrelation between supply and utilization asserts that equilibrium is achieved by a change in the total price to the patient, including the cost of time. Where the physician population is higher, the time costs to the patient of search, travel, and waiting are all reduced, which is equivalent to a decline in price. Thus-figure 1A is said to adequately describe the market for physician services if price is correctly specified.
There is, therefore, no need to introduce demand shifting as an explanation. Time costs are undoubtedly important for the average ambulatory visit, but are likely to be less relevant for in-hospital operations because the psychic costs of surgery and the time costs of hospitalization are likely to be large relative to the time costs of search, travel, and waiting. Thus, this study avoids an ambiguity Inherent in many previous studies of demand shifting.
Finally, given widespread insurance coverage for in-hospital surgery (about 80 percent of the population), the absence of accurate price data may cause fewer problems than in studies of demand for outpatient services which have lower Insurance coverage.
Although an inter-area analysis focused on surgical operations seems to offer several advantages, there are potential problems as well. First, there is probably a significant amount of "border crossing" by surgical patients. Whereas most outpatients obtain care fromnearby physicians, it is not unusual for patients to travel considerable distances for in-hospital surgery. Such "border crossing" is likely to be particularly relevant for residents of by location of hospital (AHA data), and below U.S. average by residence (HIS data). This suggests that there may be some unreciprocated border crossing into those two divisions for surgery. However, it should be noted that both those divisions had rates above the U.S. average in the HIS data for 1963, so it may be that some of the discrepancy in 1970 is the result of sampling variability.3
Another possible source of difficulty is that a significant amount of surgery (fragmentary data suggest about 20 percent)4 is performed by physicians who are not "surgical specialists"--primarily general practitioners and surgical residents. The location of surgical residents is highly correlated with that of surgeons, but the location of general practitioners is not, and some attempt will be made to take account of their supply in the analysis.
Not only are some operations performed by "non-surgeons," but surgical specialists typically do not limit their practice to performing operations. Thus, this study is concerned with only a portion (albeit the major portion) of the demand for "surgeons' services," and would result in an understatement of "demand shifting" if, as seems likely, It Is easier and more attractive for surgeons to shift the demand for office procedures and tests than for in-hospital operations.5
One problem which is perennial in attempts to estimate demand shifting Is that of simultaneity. Strong demand for surgery in an area may attract surgeons, rather than the surgeons stimulating demand. I will attempt to deal with this problem by using "predicted" physician supply rather than actual supply. The predictions will be based on a regression that incorporates "taste" variables that affect surgeon Demand. Table 3 presents the results for the demand regressions across the 22 areas. Table 4 Table 5 . These are usually very significant and virtually unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of the area variables.
It is possible that the effect of predicted supply on demand reported in Table 3 and Part A of Table 4 is really the effect of the metro-noninetro distinction on both supply and demand. To test for this possibility, similar two-stage regressions were run for just the metro areas and just the nonmetro areas, with 1963 and 1970 pooled in order to have a reasonable number of observations.10
The results for the demand regressions across the areas are reported in Table 6 and those for the regressions across cells in Table 7 .
The principal coefficient of interest is for predicted supply (S*), and we see that this coefficient is generally larger and more statistically significant in these regressions than in those that included both metro and rionmetro areas. For the five metro regressions in the two tables, the median coefficient for S* is 82, and for the 10 nonmetro regressions the median is 80. These coefficients imply an elasticity at the means of approximately .53 for the metro areas and .27 for the nonmetro areas.
The difference in elasticity reflects the much lover surgeon/population ratio in the nonmetro areas.
The nonmetro regressions were run with an exogenous METS* variable, as well as without; this coefficient was not statistically significant. A variable designed to measure the possible impact of border-crossing in metro •areas also had no significant effect. The only variable except predicted supply which came close to consistently significant results Is GP* in metro areas. The negative coefficient is similar in size to that reported in Tables 3 and 4 for 1970. In general, the separate regressions strongly support the demand shift hypothesis and reject the hypothesis that the mero-nonmetro distinction explains the observed relation between predicted supply and utilization.
Interaction with education. Mark Pauly has suggested that the ability of physicians to shift demand for their services might vary for different groups in the population. In particular, he hypothesized that the effect might be inversely related to the level of education. Table 8 reports the results of regressions directed to this question. pooled. The effect of predicted supply on demand does seem to be largest for the low education class and smallest for the high education class.
The differences between the coefficients, however, are not statistically significant.
Complexity, urgency,_necessity. Eleven frequently performed procedures11 that account for 42 percent of all nonobstetrical operations were scaled for "complexity," "urgency," and "necessity. Indexes of complexity, urgency and necessity were calculated for each cell and then regressed on the demographic dummy variables, income per capita, and predicted surgeon supply, with the results as shown in Table 9 . There seems to be some positive relation between complexity and surgeon supply, but the coefficient is not statistically significant.
The surgeon supply coefficient in the urgency index regression is large and statistically significant. Each additional surgeon per 100,000 in an area lowers the urgency index by one percent--a large change, given the relatively small variation in the urgency index across areas. The necessity index also shows an inverse relation with surgeon supply, but the effect is smaller than for the urgency index and not statistically The results (Table 11 ) reveal a positive effect of supply on price; this is clearly contrary to conventional market behavior. By contrast, the effect of demand on price is quite small. A coefficient of 1.5 for supply is equivalent to an elasticity of .5 at the means of the variables. Inasmuch as predicted price had no effect in the surgeon supply equation, we can reject the view that the high correlation between price and surgeon supply14 reflects a causal relation running from price to supply.
Discussion and Summary
The small number of observations and potential measurement error in some of the data require us to regard the results reported in this paper as less than definitive. In particular, better price data and a more robust demand specification would serve to increase confidence in the findings. The shortcomings notwithstanding, the cumulative impact of the various statistical experiments casts serious doubt concerning the stability of the demand function for operations when there is an exogenous shift in the supply of surgeons. The hypothesis that an increase in the supply of surgeons results in an increase in demand is strongly supported by the following findings:
1. "Predictedt' supply consistently has a positive effect on demand in a variety of specifications.
2. The effect is present in both 1970 and 1963 even though the quantity measure is subject to substantial sampling error and the correlation between years is not very high.
3. The effect is present and even stronger when metro areas and nonmetro areas are studied separately.
4. The supply effect on demand is inversely correlated with the level of education.
5. The supply effect is stronger for procedures deemed less urgent and less necessary by physicians.
6.
Supply has a positive effect on price; not a negative one.
Can these results be reconciled with "normal" market behavior without recourse to demand shifting? They can, but it takes some straining to do so. One possible explanation is that surgeon quality is positively correlated with the surgeon/population ratio and that higher quality induces additional demand much as a decrease in price does.15
I agree that quality is probably correlated with quantity, but it seems doubtful that the quality effect would be strong enough to explain the observed differences in utilization or price. One indicator of "quality" is the percentage of surgeons who are sub-specialists, such as ophthalmologists, orthopedists, and the like, rather than general surgeons.
This percentage is highly correlated with the surgeon/population ratio across divisions (r = .72), but the elasticity is only .15. Let us assume this captures only half of the quality difference so that the full elasticity of quality with respect to S is .3. Let us also assume that the elasticity of demand with respect to quality is .3 (about triple the probableelasticity of demand with respect to price). The "quality effect" would then yield an elasticity of demand with respect to supply of .09, considerably less than the elasticity actually observed. Furthermore, it should be noted that "better quality" surgeons frequently recommend less surgery than do their colleagues with less training.
I believe that the "stylized facts" revealed in this paper can be summarized as follows: Surgeons have considerable discretion in choice of location and their distribution is determined partly by their preferences as consumers. Thus geographical areas differ in their surgeon/ population ratio for reasons unrelated to the inherent demand for operations. Where surgeons are more numerous, the demand for operations increases. Other things equal, a 10 percent higher surgeon/population ratio results in about a three percent increase in the number of operations and an increase in price. Thus, the average surgeon's workload decreases by seven percent, but income per surgeon declines by much less.
These findings do leave one troublesome question. If surgeons can raise prices where they are more numerous, why don't they raise them even higher where the surgeon/population ratio is lower? One possible answer is that their incomes are already satisfactory because of their higher (but not excessively high) workloads, and they have less incentive to induce additional demand.
The implications for national policy of these results seem striking.
If the surgeon/population ratio should increase (this seems likely if no action is taken), the result will probably be higher rather than lower fees, and also more operations. The marginal benefit of these operations relative to marginal cost is not addressed in this paper, but recent studies by physicians raise serious doubts, at least for some procedures [Paradise, et. al 1978; Bunker 1977] .
One clear limitation of this study is the omission of that portion of surgeons' workload unrelated to in-hospital operations. As suggested previously, the surgeons' ability to shift the demand for out-patient services is probably greater than for operations. Thus the total impact of supply on demand may be larger, and the implied difference in income per surgeon smaller, than that observed in this study. Indeed, while the weakness of some of the data, and the tentative character of the conclusions need to be stressed, it should also be noted that some of these weaknesses probably serve to understate rather than exaggerate the extent to which surgeons can shift the demand for their own services. astandard error of the regression. aAge, sex, race, education dummy variables included; regression coefficients are presented in Table 5 .
b Elasticities at means. (2) INC*, S*, METS*, and GP* included as right-hand-side variables. Williamson-BLS indexb (2) Deflated surgical price index
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